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Admissibility of Expert Testimony After Daubert and Foret:
A Wider Gate, A More Vigilant Gatekeeper
No one will deny that the law should in some way effectively use expert
knowledge wherever it will aid in settling disputes. The only question
is as to how it can do so best.
Learned Hand (1901)'
I. INTRODUCTION
Even in Learned Hand's day, when the use of expert testimony was rare, the
question of when to admit such testimony was problematic. Today the use of
expert testimony is rampant and the admission or exclusion of this testimony
often determines the outcome of the case. The standards used to decide
admissibility have varied within the federal court system and between the federal
and state systems. The United States Supreme Court settled a number of vital
questions for federal courts about the admissibility of expert testimony in
general, and expert scientific testimony in particular, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 decided on June 28, 1993.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, faced with admissibility of borderline,
scientific evidence, adopted the Daubert reasoning in State v. Foret,3 on
November 30, 1993. The admissibility of expert testimony for Louisiana state
courts will now follow the same standards as set by Daubert for federal courts.
The major change initiated by Daubert is to establish a gatekeeping role for
trial judges-to require them to make a preliminary assessment on expert
testimony, which may require an evidentiary hearing. The judge must assess
four aspects of expert testimony: (1) the qualifications of the expert;4 (2) the
reliability of the expert testimony;5 (3) the "helpfulness" of the testimony to the
trier of fact; 6 and (4) the prejudicial effect of the testimony.7 When the expert
testimony offered is scientific in nature, then Daubert gives guidance on how to
determine the second aspect, reliability.
Part II will explain the Supreme Court's opinion in Daubert in light of the
confusion of the lower courts prior to the decision and will analyze the new
standards to be used in deciding admissibility of expert scientific testimony.
Copyright 1994, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15
Harv. L. Rev. 40, 40 (1901).
2. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
3. 628 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1993).
4. Dauber, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
5. Id. at 2795.
6. Id
7. Id. at 279R
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Additionally, Part II will assess the success of lower federal courts that have
interpreted and applied Daubert. Part III will concentrate on the Louisiana
Supreme Court opinion in Foret, a criminal case in which the court was
concerned with admissibility of testimony of a psychologist giving an opinion on
the veracity of a child witness alleged to be the victim of child sexual abuse.
Part III will also consider how the Daubert reasoning adopted by the Foret court
will change existing law in Louisiana state courts. Part IV will summarize the
current law pertaining to the admissibility of expert testimony, especially expert
scientific testimony, and discuss potential differences in application between a
civil trial and a criminal trial.
II. DAUBERT AND THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Facts of Daubert
The Daubert case is a classic example of the problems facing courts in
deciding the admissibility of expert scientific testimony. Typically, an injured,
sympathetic plaintiff can establish the element of causation only by expert
testimony. Jason Daubert was born with a severe limb reduction, a birth defect
occurring in less than 1 of 1000 live births.' Jason's mother believed the defect
was due to the prescription anti-nausea drug Bendectin, taken for severe morning
sickness during the first few weeks of her pregnancy when the limbs are forming
in the fetus.9 The Dauberts sued Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Merrell
Dow"), the manufacturer of the drug, in the federal district court for the Southern
District of California. 0
The plaintiffs proffered eight experts who would testify to four types of
studies to support causation: chemical structure activity analysis, in vitro animal
cell experiments, in vivo animal teratology studies, and reanalysis of previously
published epidemiological studies." The district court held that causation
8. Lynch v. Merrell-National Lab., 830 F.2d 1190, 1193 (1st Cir. 1987) (according to Murray
G. Feingold, Physician-in-Chief at the National Birth Defects Center).
9. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D. Cal. 1989),
affrd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
10. Id.
11. See generally Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of
Mass Torts, 43 Hastings L.J. 301 (1992). Chemical structure analysis compares the structure of
Bendectin with chemicals known to be teratogenic (able to cause severe anatomical defects). In vitro
animal cell studies expose single cells, organs, or whole embryos to Bendectin and then examine the
biochemical effects. Extrapolation to whole animals, including humans, is very difficult. In vivo
animal teratology studies examine the effects of Bendectin at various dose levels, usually very high,
on animal species thought to be similar to humans in their response. Problems include extrapolation
to humans and to a lower, more realistic drug exposure. Epidemiological studies compare the
incidence of birth defects among humans exposed and those not exposed to Bendectin. The benefit
of this type of study is that humans are used and no extrapolation from other animal species is
necessary. Epidemiological studies do have problems in the methodology used in collecting and
analyzing the data.
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shown through epidemiological data was the only method generally accepted by
the scientific community; therefore, any expert opinion not based on such studies
was inadmissible. Using this reasoning, the first three types of studies were
ruled inadmissible." The plaintiff's epidemiological data was judged weak
evidence because of the following: (1) the reanalysis technique had not been
subjected to peer review of the epidemiological community; (2) the reanalysis did
not establish a statistically significant correlation between Bendectin and limb
birth defects; and (3) the thirty published epidemiological studies presented by
defendant's expert had found no statistical association between the ingestion of
Bendectin and limb reduction birth defects. 3 The court granted summary
judgment for Merrell Dow, ruling that the plaintiffs' evidence, as a matter of
law, did not support causal connection between use of the drug and this type of
birth defect. The strongest inference from the admissible data was that
Bendectin possibly could have caused the injury; the plaintiffs did not reach the
more probable than not standard needed to overcome summary judgment. 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the finding
of the district court that the evidence presented by the Dauberts provided
insufficient foundation to allow admission of expert testimony suggesting that
Bendectin caused the plaintiffs' injury. 5 The circuit court stated the reanalysis
data did not meet the "general acceptance" standard, emphasizing that the
reanalysis had not been subjected to peer review, and that most other courts had
refused to admit this particular testimony.'6 The United States Supreme Court
vacates the judgment and remands on the basis that the lower courts had used the
wrong standard to decide admissibility of expert scientific testimony.'
7
B. "Certworthiness" of Daubert
1. Overview of the Confusion in the Courts Prior to Daubert
The use of expert testimony in trials has increased exponentially over the
years. The Daubert case represents the confusion that has plagued the courts in
facing increasing numbers of experts willing to testify to a wide range of
"scientific" opinions. In dealing with this confusion, a trial judge has to face a
number of questions. The first question is whether the judge will be an active
or passive player in monitoring the expert testimony.' 8 Some play an entirely
12. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575.
13. Id. at 575-76.
14. Id. at 576.
15. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113
S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
16. Id. at 1130-31.
17. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2799 (1993).
18. See L. L. Plotkin, Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: What Is the Court's Role
in Evaluating Expert Testimony?, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 1263 (1990).
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passive role.' As one judge stated, "[If experts are willing to testify that such
a link exists, it is for the jury to decide whether to credit such testimony.' 20
Increasingly, judges are taking a more active role in screening the expert
testimony before allowing it to be presented to the jury. Judge Weinstein, an
authority on evidence,21 in In Re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litiga-
tion,22 stated, "The uncertainty of the evidence in such cases, dependent as it
is upon speculative scientific hypotheses and epidemiological studies, creates a
special need for robust screening of experts and gatekeeping ... by the
court."
2 3
The second question facing a judge who chooses an active role is what
standard to use in evaluating the expert testimony. Prior to Daubert, federal
lower courts were divided over whether expert scientific testimony must be based
on techniques or principles that were "generally accepted" in the appropriate
scientific community. Before the promulgation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975, most courts followed this "general acceptance" standard
announced in Frye v. United States:
25
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.26
After adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a controversy began in the
lower federal courts whether Frye was still applicable. Some circuit courts
abandoned the use of the strict "general acceptance" threshold for a more liberal
approach compatible with the underlying policy of the Rules.27 Others held that
the Frye standard co-existed with the Rules and continued to apply it.28
19. See, e.g., Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals Corp., 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 950, 107 S. Ct. 437 (1986); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1062, 105 S. Ct. 545 (1984).
20. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1534.
21. Judge Weinstein is co-author of a treatise on evidence, Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence (1982).
22. 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234, 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988).
23. id. at 1260.
24. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States,
a Half.Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197 (1980).
25. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
26. Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
27. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Williams, 583
F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117, 99 S. Ct. 1025 (1979).
28. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
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Another area of confusion in deciding admissibility of expert scientific
testimony is interpreting and distinguishing between Federal Rules of Evidence
702 and 703.29 Rule 702, "Testimony by Experts," states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise."
Thus, Rule 702 presents a two-part test: "does the witness qualify as an expert,
and, if so, will the proffered testimony assist the trier of fact?" 3'
Rule 703, "Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts," states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.32
Rule 703 expands the permissible bases for expert testimony to include any data,
admissible or not, "as long as other experts in the field would 'reasonably' rely"
upon similar data.33 However, some courts have erroneously relied upon Rule
703, instead of Rule 702, when excluding expert testimony because of an opinion
based on an unreliable methodology or because of reaching conclusions contrary
to generally recognized studies.3
The final area of confusion is in dealing with borderline expert testimony
and its use in granting summary judgment or directing a verdict. In a trial, two
levels of inquiry are available to a judge to monitor expert testimony: (1) the
admissibility level, where the court decides whether the testimony will be
considered at all; and (2) the sufficiency level, where the evidence is admitted
but the weight of the evidence as a whole is considered to determine whether the
evidence is sufficient to meet the standard of proof required. The discrepancy
between courts on which level to handle borderline evidence is particularly well
demonstrated by the Bendectin litigation.33 Some judges have ruled the
Ct. 1280 (1992); United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Shorter, 809
F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S. Ct. 71 (1987); United States v. Solomon, 753
F.2d 1522 (9th Cir. 1985).
29. See Michael C. McCarthy, "Helpful" or "Reasonably Reliable"? Analyzing the Expert
Witness's Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 350
(1992).
30. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
31. McCarthy, supra note 29, at 355.
32. Fed. R. Evid. 703.
33. McCarthy, supra note 29, at 356.
34. See generally McCarthy, supra note 29.
35. See generally Sanders, supra note 11.
1994]
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plaintiffs evidence inadmissible and then granted summary judgment for the
defendant. 36 Others have allowed the evidence to be presented and either granted
a directed verdict for the defendant or a judgment n.o.v.37 after a jury verdict
for the plaintiff.38 There is only one reported Bendectin case where a jury
verdict for the plaintiff was allowed to stand. In Oxendine v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,39 the D.C. appellate court allowed the plaintiff to recover
damages by reversing the trial court's ruling for the defendant of a judgment
n.o.v. The appellate court, following a passive judge policy, stated: "The case
was thus a classic battle of the experts, a battle in which the jury must decide the
victor."'
2. Why was writ of certiorari granted in Daubert?
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Daubert after having denied writs
in several other cases on admissibility of expert testimony41 and even on
Bendectin use.42 Why was the writ granted? Three Justices had previously
dissented to writ denials of similar cases believing that the confusion in the
circuit courts, especially over the use of the Frye standard, warranted intervention
by the Supreme Court.4 3 Daubert presented a perfect test case because the
lower courts expressed strong opinions on sensitive issues: (1) most of the
evidence was excluded and not merely ruled insufficient; (2) the courts relied on
the Frye standard of admissibility and set publication or peer review as the major
way to achieve that standard; (3) the circuit court placed great emphasis on the
36. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113
S. Ct. 2786 (1993); Lynch v. Merrell-National Lab., 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987).
37. In federal courts, this term has been replaced with "judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50.
38. Turpin v. Menell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 84 (1992); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.), modified, 884
F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046, 110 S. Ct. 1511 (1990); Richardson v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882, 110 S. Ct. 218
(1989). For a discussion of the evolution of the changing name of Merrell .Dow, see Sanders, supra
note 11, at 311.
39. 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074, 110 S. Ct. 1121 (1990).
40. Id. at 1110 (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1062, 105 S. Ct. 545 (1984) (quoting Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637, 646
(D.C. Cir. 1962))).
41. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1280 (1992); United States v. Mustafa, 22 M.J. 165 (C.M.A.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 953, 107
S. Ct. 444 (1986).
42. See cases cited supra note 38; Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950, 111 S. Ct. 370 (1990); In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006, 109 S. Ct. 788 (1989).
43. See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1280, 1281 (1992) (White, J., and
Blackmun, J., dissenting); Mustafa v. United States, 479 U.S. 953, 107 S. Ct. 444 (1986) (White,
J., and Brennan, J., dissenting).
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fact that the conclusions of the reanalysis study was opposite the majority of the
studies and that this evidence had been excluded by other courts; and (4) both
district and circuit courts held that epidemiological data was the accepted method
to establish causation in Bendectin cases."
C. The Supreme Court Opinion in Daubert
The Supreme Court in Daubert unequivocally changes the standards and
approach to expert testimony. The court imposes upon the trial judge the duty
to be an active gatekeeper in screening expert testimony. However, because Rule
702 only requires that the evidence proffered be reliable and relevant, the Frye
standard cannot be required as the exclusive threshold for admission.4 The
Federal Rules of Evidence are more liberal. Although expert scientific testimony
must be screened for reliability, "general acceptance" is not invariably required.
The Court holds that reliability of expert scientific testimony is to be determined
in light of four non-exclusive factors, of which the Frye standard is only one.46
1. The death of Frye
A unanimous Court, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, announces
the death of the "general acceptance" standard of Frye as a threshold to
admission of expert testimony. Relying on Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,47
the Court holds that the Federal Rules of Evidence should be interpreted like any
other statute.48 The basic principle of the Rules is contained in Rule 402,
which establishes a liberal standard to admission of evidence. Rule 402 states:
"All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible. 49
The interaction of the Federal Rules of Evidence with the background of
previous common law was considered in United States v. Abel. 0 The Court in
Abel held that evidence questions are "governed by the Federal Rules of
Evidence"'" but common-law knowledge could be used to aid in their interpre-
tation and application. Where a well-defined common-law doctrine, however,
was not found in the Rules, then the Court held the Rules superseded the past
44. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572-75 (S.D. Cal. 1989),
aft'd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
45. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993).
46. Id. at 2796-97.
47. 488 U.S. 153, 163, 109 S. Ct. 439, 446 (1988).
48. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793.
49. Fed. R. Evid. 402.
50. 469 U.S. 45, 105 S. Ct. 465 (1984).
51. Id. at 49, 105 S. Ct. at 467.
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common-law evidence rule. In Bourjaily v. United States,52 for instance, the
Court refused to find that the Rules had implicitly incorporated the common-law
"bootstrapping rule." 3 Following this precedent, in Daubert, the Frye standard,
as an exclusive test for admissibility, is deemed to be too rigid for the liberal
philosophy of the Rules. Justice Blackmun writes: "That austere standard,
absent from and incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be
applied in federal trials."'
2. Rule 702, Limits on Admissibility of Expert Scientific Testimony
In the second part of the opinion, seven members of the Court choose to
give guidance to the lower courts in interpreting Rule 702 to set limits on the
admissibility of expert scientific testimony. Chief Justice Rehnquist, with Justice
Stevens joining,dissents on this issue, believing the Court should decide only the
question presented, the interaction of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Frye
standard.55
Justice Blackmun first settles the question of whether the trial court judge
should play an active or passive role in the process. In strong language he
assigns an active role to the judge: "Nor is the trial judge disabled from
screening such evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable. 56
The majority find that Rule 702 governs the reliability of expert scientific
testimony by regulating both the "subjects and theories about which an expert
may testify."57 The language of the Rule that imparts this regulation is the
requirement of "scientific ... knowledge."58 The Court limits discussion on
determination of reliability to expert scientific testimony and does not consider
the other two types of testimony contemplated by Rule 702: "technical, or other
specialized knowledge." 59 Justice Blackmun defines "scientific knowledge" as
an inference or assertion that is derived by methods and procedures with a solid
grounding in science.' The methods and procedures must be based on what
are known to be valid scientific principles. A valid scientific principle is one
52. 483 U.S. 171, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987).
53. Id. at 181, 107 S. Ct. at 2781. The "bootstrapping rule" under the common law stated that
to use a co-conspirator's statement against a defendant, the conspiracy first must be proven
independent of the statement. In Bourjaily, the Court held that a co-conspirator's statement could
be used to help prove the conspiracy.
54. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993).
55. Id. at 2800.
56. Id. at 2795 (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. n.8.
60. Id. at 2795.
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that supports what is being stated and is well-established.6 Thus, the expert's
testimony cannot be based on a "subjective belief or unsupported speculation"'62
but must be based on a body of known facts with inferences supported by
experiments that use scientific methods. For instance, a scientific expert would
not be allowed to testify on the effects of a drug if that expert's opinion is based
on an untested, religious belief.
Justice Blackmun struggles to find a basis for "evidentiary reliability" for the
testimony of experts. He defines evidentiary reliability as "trustworthiness." 63
The traditional basis for evidentiary reliability for testimony of witnesses is first-
hand knowledge. Expert witnesses are given special treatment in the Rules
because first-hand knowledge is not required and they are allowed to give
opinion testimony." This "wide latitude" given to experts is based on the
"assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge
and experience of his discipline., 65 Though not stated in the opinion, based on
this reasoning, the requirement for reliability would stand for all expert
testimony, including "technical, or other specialized knowledge" listed in Rule
702."
Another requirement found in the language of Rule 702 by the majority is
relevance. Rule 702 states that the testimony must "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."67 This requirement
was described by Judge Becker in United States v. Downing 6 as "sufficiently
tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual
dispute." Justice Blackmun requires a "valid scientific connection to the
pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility."69 An example, given in
the opinion, is the relevance of expert testimony on the fullness of the moon on
a particular night. This testimony would be admissible in a case to prove how
dark a certain night was, but would not be allowed in a case where the issue was
the likelihood of irrational behavior.7°
The Court thus finds in Rule 702 the authority for a trial judge to regulate
expert scientific testimony by making an initial decision about the reliability and
relevance of the evidence. Justice Blackmun again declares that the trial judge
61. Id n.9.
62. Id at 2795.
63. Id n.9.
64. Fed. R. Evid. 602 states:
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support
a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove
personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness' own testimony. This rule
is subject to the provisions of rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses.
65. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993).
66. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
67. Id.
68. 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985).
69. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
70. Id
13151994]
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should play an active role in this determination: "Faced with a proffer of expert
scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant
to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific
knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact
in issue.'
Justice Blackmun then gives the trial judge guidance on making a determina-
tion of scientifically valid reasoning or methodology. He discusses an illustrative
list of four factors to be considered. The first factor, a "key" factor, in
determining the validity of a theory or technique is "whether it can be (and has
been) tested. 72  In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist regards this factor
particularly as being too ambiguous to be of assistance. 73 This test of "falsifi-
ability, or refutability, or testability 74 refers to the basic way knowledge in
science progresses, i.e., the scientific method. This method requires first
developing a hypothesis concerning an interesting observation. Then the
hypothesis is tested by setting up an experiment. The experiment, if set up
correctly with the right controls, will be able to either reject the hypothesis
(falsify it) or support the hypothesis. Thus, the test of "falsifiability" means that
the theory or technique is susceptible to being tested by appropriate experiments.
What theory or technique cannot be tested? Any theory or technique that when
traced back through the mental inferential steps eventually comes to a subjective
belief or comes to an assertion counter to known laws of nature, i.e., an
astrological prediction or religious belief, could not be tested experimentally.
The second factor lists peer review and publication as relevant to the inquiry
of evidentiary reliability, but Justice Blackmun emphasizes that lack of peer
review is not dispositive. 75  He recognizes that there are well-grounded and
innovative theories that have not been subjected to peer review either because
they are too new or because they are so specialized to the litigation at hand that
these theories do not warrant publication. The trial judge may consider whether
proffered testimony has been subjected to peer review and, if not, may inquire
into the reasons why. One question repeatedly asked in the Bendectin litigation
was why the experts did not publish their reanalysis of the epidemiological data.
The reanalysis was not new since it had been used in trials since 198576 and
was certainly of general interest if able to show a correlation between Bendectin
ingestion and reduced limb birth defects.
71. Id. (emphasis added). Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) states, "Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence
shall be determined by the court ...."
72. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
73. Id. at 2800 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
74. Id. at 2797 (quoting Kenneth Popper. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of
Scientific Knowledge 37 (5th ed. 1989)).
75. l
76. Sanders, supra note 11, at 346 n.199.
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The third factor is especially useful to evaluate scientific techniques, for
instance DNA fingerprinting or polygraph tests. Justice Blackmun indicates that
the court "ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error and the
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation.
77
This factor restricts use of scientific techniques to those that have been developed
to the point where the error rate and appropriate standards are known. New, unique
scientific techniques that are offered would face a substantial obstacle for
admission.
The fourth factor is the "general acceptance" standard from Frye. This is still
a relevant inquiry and is an easy way to admit testimony based on well-established
scientific principles. Testimony previously admitted under the "general accep-
tance" standard should be admissible under Daubert. The lack of general
acceptance will not in itself prevent the evidence from being admitted but will
require a more in depth inquiry upon which to base reliability, and the theory "may
properly be viewed with skepticism. '7 8
Justice Blackmun emphasizes the flexibility of the inquiry. He also states
emphatically that the inquiry should focus solely on the principles and methodology
and not on the conclusions that are generated. 79 This directly negates the tendency
in the lower courts to exclude evidence when the conclusion clashes with that
supported by the majority of the evidence, as demonstrated in Daubert and in Judge
Weinstein's decision in In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation.80
3. Interaction of Rule 702 with Other Federal Rules of Evidence
Justice Blackmun correctly recognizes that Rule 702 governs the admissibility
of expert testimony8 ' while Rule 703 governs the data or facts from the particular
case upon which the expert is basing his opinion, and does not govern the validity
of his methodology.' 2 Rule 703 states in part: "If of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject,
the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence."' 3 This rule allows the use
of facts or data by the expert that might otherwise be inadmissible hearsay. It does
not refer to the methodology used by the expert witness to analyze the facts or data.
77. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993) (emphasis
added).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), afT'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234, 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988).
81. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
82. Id. at 2797-98.
83. Fed. R. Evid. 703.
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Justice Blackmun reminds courts of the availability of Rule 706, which allows
the court to appoint its own expert for assistance.8 This method has been cited.
as a way to counter "junk science" in the courtroom. 5
Even if the evidence is admissible by Rule 702, the trial judge must still
consider Rule 403, which allows exclusion of relevant evidence "if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury ... ."86 Given the deference afforded an
expert witness by the jury and to the possibility of misleading the jury, "the
judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force ... exercises more
control over experts than over lay witnesses.""7 Testimony admissible under
Rule 702 may still be excluded under Rule 403 if the probative value of the
testimony is low and the prejudicial effect is high.
4. The Dilemma of Expert Scientific Testimony
The Daubert case generated great interest in the scientific and medical
communities, as illustrated by the 22 amicus briefs filed. The concerns
expressed in these briefs could be divided into two ends of a spectrum. At one
end are those primarily interested in keeping "junk science" out of the courtroom
by restricting testimony to "general acceptance" within the appropriate scientific
community, i.e., to maintain the Frye standard as a threshold to admissibility.8
On the opposite end are those worried about valid scientific theories being
excluded from the courtroom resulting in a plaintiff losing his case because the
theory has not been tested sufficiently to have reached "general acceptance." 89
Justice Blackmun acknowledges the legitimate concern of both sides but
dismisses them both by emphasizing the role of the adversarial system in a trial
and recognizing the time limitation in resolving legal disputes. "Shaky"
evidence, admissible under Rule 702 and the new guidelines, is more appropri-
ately attacked by "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
84. Fed. R. Evid. 706(a) states, in pertinent part: "The court may on its own motion or on the
motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and
may request the parties to submit nominations."
85. Peter W. Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom 206 (1991).
86. Fed. R. Evid. 403 in its entirety states, "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence."
87. Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be
Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991).
88. See, e.g., Brief for The American Association for the Advancement of Science and the
National Academy of Sciences as Amici Curiae at 13, and Brief for The American Medical Society
et al. as Amici Curiae at 11, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)
(No. 92-102).
89. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae American Society of Law, Medicine, and Ethics Devra Lee
at 16; Brief Amici Curiae of Physicians, Scientists, and Historians of Science at 13, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102).
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evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof."'  Additionally, in a
civil trial, the judge is always able to rule on the weight of the evidence in a
motion for summary judgment or directed verdict, a practice preferred by Justice
Blackmun instead of wholesale inadmittance. He cites with approval the
handling of evidence in two Bendectin cases: Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceu-
ticals, Inc.9 and Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.92 The court in
Brock reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff by granting a judgment n.o.v. for
the defendant on the basis that the evidence regarding causation was insuffi-
cient. 93 The Turpin court granted the defendants a summary judgment, ruling
the evidence was insufficient to take the issue to the jury.9' Thus, Justice
Blackmun favors admitting "borderline" evidence and then ruling on the weight
of the evidence. A question not addressed in the opinion is whether Justice
Blackmun would follow the same reasoning and admit borderline evidence in a
criminal case."
Justice Blackmun concedes that "in practice, a gatekeeping role for the
judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from
learning of authentic insights and innovations." 9 This is a necessary result of
the differences in the constraint of time on the legal and scientific communities:
legal disputes must be resolved quickly and finally, unlike scientific inquiry,
which may continue indefinitely. "That, nevertheless, is the balance that is
struck by Rules of Evidence," Justice Blackmun writes, "designed not for the
exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution
of legal disputes." 97 Justice Blackmun recognizes that scientific investigation
into a phenomenon often takes decades, even centuries, before a consensus is
reached. In a legal setting, however, the matter before the court must be
resolved in a timely manner with the knowledge then available. The scientific
knowledge used in a courtroom need not have gained "general acceptance"
within the scientific community but it must at least be based on well-established
scientific principles.
1
5. The Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, agrees with the ousting
of a strict threshold of the Frye "general acceptance" standard and with some
90. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61, 107 S. Ct. 2704,
2714 (1987)).
91. 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1046, 110 S. Ct. 1511 (1990).
92. 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 84 (1992).
93. Brock, 874 F.2d at 315.
94. Turpin, 959 F.2d at 1360-61.
95. This issue is discussed infra Part IV in comparing Daubert with State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d
1116 (La. 1993).
96. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798-99 (1993).
97. Id. at 2799.
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gatekeeping role of the trial judge. He disagrees with the remainder of the
opinion, believing the guidelines expressed in the majority opinion to be
unnecessary and "to be not only general, but vague and abstract."9 He would
have the Court decide "only the questions presented, and to leave the further
development of this important area of the law to future cases." 99
Specifically, the Chief Justice dislikes reading into the Rules the requirement
of reliability. Furthermore, he believes the illustrative factors given for guidance
by the majority will only confuse the trial judges because the factors are vague
and ambiguous. For example, he wonders what is the difference in scientific and
technical knowledge and what is meant by "falsifiability?"' °  He argues that
the trial judges will have to become "amateur scientists" to perform this
gatekeeping role as defined by the majority. 1"
C. Aftermath of Daubert: Helpful or Ambiguous Guidelines?
Does the Daubert decision help to clear the confusion regarding admission
of expert testimony or does it just replace a clear standard with an ambiguous
one? The decision definitely gives guidelines on how to treat expert testimony.
The federal district judge is given an active gatekeeping role in monitoring the
expert scientific testimony for both relevance and reliability. The Frye standard
is not to be used as a threshold requirement, but remains a factor to be
considered. Rule 702, not 703, is to be used in deciding the admissibility of
expert scientific testimony when considering the qualifications of the expert, the
relevance of the testimony to the case, and the reliability of the testimony. In
judging the reliability of the expert scientific testimony, the judge is not to
consider the conclusions reached by the expert but only the reasoning and
methods used to reach those conclusions. Finally, for borderline scientific
evidence, Justice Blackmun definitely favors admitting the evidence and then
deciding the case based on sufficiency, determined by presentation of opposing
experts and evidence and by flushing out problems with the expert testimony by
cross-examination.
How useful have the lower district and circuit courts found the guidelines
established in Daubert? The overwhelming response to this decision has been
positive. Many courts rely on the decision to emphasize the gatekeeping power
and responsibility of the trial judge.'0 2 In In re Joint Eastern and Southern
98. Id (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
99. Id at 2800 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
ioo. Id.
101. Id.
102. United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 58 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Abuchaibe
Hnos. Ltda. v. United States, 62 U.S.L.W. 3454 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1994) (No. 93-1018); Rosado v.
Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 124 n.9 (5th Cir. 1993); Chikovsky v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals Corp., 832 F. Supp.
341, 344 (S.D. Fla. 1993); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1032
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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Districts Asbestos Litigation,°3 Judge Weinstein describes the need for
"'Daubert hearings' under Rule 104 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to
determine whether, and under what conditions, expert testimony is admissi-
ble.,,104
In considering expert scientific testimony, the lower courts successfully use
the framework and the flexibility in the Daubert analysis. Indeed, the courts
seem to appreciate the clear language in Daubert, using the four factors to help
structure a discussion of the admissibility of the testimony. Several courts have
found the proposed testimony inadmissible under Daubert for various reasons:
expert not qualified in the field, 5 opinion based on flawed methodology,"°
opinion based on pure speculation,' 7 and opinion based on an unreliable
technique.'0 These initial opinions seem to indicate that Daubert, by rejecting
the Frye threshold, is not opening the floodgates to expert testimony, but is
supplying a fairer standard on which to base admissibility.
103. 151 F.R.D. 540 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
104. ld. at 545.
105. Rosado, 5 F.3d at 124 (holding as unqualified an accident reconstructionist who was unable
to provide an adequate basis for his testimony and who had not been qualified to testify for 20 years);
Wilson v. Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1238 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding the witness was not an expert in the
"physiology of torture," if such a field exists); Delaney v. Merchants River Transp., 829 F. Supp.
186, 189 (W.D. La. 1993), aff'd, 16 F.3d 1214 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding plaintiff's expert had limited
experience in design of inland, open barges).
106. Scales v. George Washington Univ., Civ. A. No. 89-0796-LFO, 1993 WL 304016 at *6
(D.D.C. July 27, 1993) (holding that testimony by expert in econometrics was based on flawed data
and not derived from a reliable scientific analysis); Haim v. Secretary, Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., No. 90-1031V, 1993 WL 346392 at *10-15 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 27, 1993) (discussing Daubert at
length and finding the expert's testimony unreliable and not grounded in scientific methodology and
procedure).
107. O'Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1106-07 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
testimony that mere observation can ascertain that cataracts were caused by radiation as speculative);
Porter v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 612-16 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding inadmissible testimony
of experts concerning ibuprofen as a cause of acute renal failure based on belief and not on research
or published reports); Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 567-70 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(finding an economist's testimony of future earning capacity as purely speculative); Chikovsky v.
Ortho Pharmaceuticals Corp., 832 F. Supp. 341, 344-46 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding inadmissible
testimony that Retin-A is a teratogen when opinion based upon subjective criteria and not upon
experiments or publications); Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565, 566-68 (N.D. Il1.
1993) (finding inadmissible testimony by a mechanical engineer who claimed a blade saw could be
designed safer but who had only thought of a new design and had not tested the design or offered
any support for its feasibility); Liu v. Korean Air Lines Co., No. 84 Civ. 0690, 1993 WL 478343
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1993) (finding some testimony by an economist admissible and some
inadmissible since based on speculation about the future employment status); Richardson v. United
States, 835 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (E.D. Wash. 1993) (finding inadmissible testimony by accident
reconstructionist based on pure speculation since essential measurements were not made at the scene).
108. United States v. Black, 831 F. Supp. 120, 122-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that even under
Daubert polygraph evidence is unreliable and inadmissible).
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Several decisions use the framework in Daubert to consider the reliability
of scientific techniques, including gas chromatography' ° 9 and DNA profile
evidence." ° The courts considering DNA profiling under Daubert have
admitted the testimony, at least in part.
Other courts have cited Daubert to support the granting of a directed verdict
or judgment n.o.v. for the defendant due to insufficient evidence."' One case,
Elkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,"2 is a Bendectin case with the same
evidence offered as in Daubert. The Sixth Circuit, relying on previous decisions
in two Bendectin cases," 3 granted summary judgment for the defendant based
on the insufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence.
One court has even extended the decision in Daubert to include "technical,
or other specialized knowledge.""' 4 In United States v. Markum,"5 the court
states Daubert incorrectly for the proposition that "the trial court must determine
whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or
determine a fact in issue."" 6 The testimony of a firefighter with twenty-nine
years experience was admitted to establish that a fire was caused by arson."7
Only one court has taken exception to Daubert. In United States v.
Locascio,"8 the Second Circuit ruled that it was not necessary for the trial
109. United States v. Bynum, 3 F.3d 769, 773 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1105
(1994) (admitting testimony that three packages of crack cocaine came from the same batch based
on gas chromatography).
110. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 551-68 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that Daubert is only
concerned with reliability of the methods and not with the validity or reliability of the conclusions
which go to the weight of the evidence; holds DNA testimony admissible after a lengthy discussion
of the Daubert factors to the DNA methodology); United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1196-98
(8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 734 (1994) (holding that courts can take judicial notice of
the reliability of the technique of DNA profiling but must still inquire into the validity of the actual
application of the method in each case); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Penn, 838 F. Supp.
1054, 1056-74 (D.V.I. 1993) (discussing in detail the method of DNA profiling and then applying
the Daubert analysis to admit the testimony; an excellent explanation of the theory and technique of
DNA profiling).
111. Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1236-41 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 554 (1993) (finding that the district court erred in not admitting
economists' testimony under the standards expressed by Daubert, but that for one defendant the
evidence was insufficient to draw any conclusion); Hodges v. Secretary, Dep't Health & Human
Servs., 9 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding insufficient evidence that DPT vaccine caused death of
infant; dissenting opinion has good discussion of preponderance standard and medical certainty
standard).
112. 8 F.3d 1068 (6th Cir. 1993).
113. Lee v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 961 F.2d 1577 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 197
(1992); Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 84 (1992).
114. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
115. 4 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 1993).
116. Id. at 895 (emphasis added; states Daubert incorrectly by adding the emphasized language).
117. Id.
118. 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993).
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judge to make an explicit determination of trustworthiness for all expert
testimony. " 9 This court, however, was not faced with scientific evidence but
with technical or other specialized knowledge-a government agent testifying to
the structure and operating rules of organized crime families by using informants
and taped conversations.'2 In addition, the court was addressing a Rule 703
question-the use of facts from informants in formulating an opinion. No
language in Daubert states or implies that trustworthiness must be proven for the
facts or data that fall under Rule 703.
Finally, one court has cited Daubert to support the use of a court-appointed
expert under Rule 706. 12 The court stated: "The Supreme Court has recently
emphasized the role of the trial courts in evaluating expert claims utilizing the
tools provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence."12 2  The court asked the
parties to prepare a list of experts from which the court would select an expert
to analyze all the medical and psychological data in the case.
2 3
In summary, the federal courts citing Daubert have had no trouble adapting
the decision to their specific cases. The trial judges are able to rise to the
gatekeeping role and the loss of the Frye standard has not led to more "junk
science" in the courtroom. The Daubert decision, instead, has proven to be
flexible and helpful. More importantly, it has imposed uniformity on the lower
courts in requiring an active gatekeeping role by the judge and in establishing the
threshold standard for admissibility of expert scientific testimony.
Ill. DAUBERT, FORET AND THE LOUISIANA COURTS
In State v. Foret, 4 the Louisiana Supreme Court, considering the admissi-
bility of expert testimony under Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702, adopted
the Daubert decision as the appropriate analysis to determine the active role of
the trial judge, the proper threshold of reliability and relevancy, and the
guidelines to determine reliability. In doing so, Louisiana joins five other states
that have cited Daubert with approval.'
119. Id. at 938-39.
120. hd at 937.
121. DeAngelis v. A. Tarricone, Inc., 151 F.R.D. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
122. Id. at 246.
123. Id.
124. 628 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1993).
125. The response of other states to the Daubert decision depends on the status of the "general
acceptance" standard in that state. Four state courts (Oregon, Wyoming, Delaware, and Arkansas)
have rejected the Frye standard previously and cite Daubert in support of their current interpretation
and use of Rule 702 (or its equivalent). Jones v. State, 862 S.W.2d 242 (Ark. 1993); Nelson v. State,
628 A.2d 69 (Del. Supr. 1993); State v. Futch, 860 P.2d 264 (Or. App. 1993); Springfield v. State,
860 P.2d 435 (Wyo. 1993). One state, New Mexico, was persuaded by the Daubert decision to
follow the federal lead and reject the Frye standard as a threshold to admissibility. State v. Alberico,
861 P.2d 192 (N.M. 1993). Two state supreme courts (Arizona and South Dakota) take notice of
Daubert but decline to decide the impact of the case on the use of Frye in state courts. State v.
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A. Facts of Foret
Hypolite Foret was convicted of attempted molestation of a juvenile, his
stepdaughter. The alleged molestation occurred over a one-and-a-half to two-
year period when his stepdaughter was twelve to fourteen years old. The victim
made the allegations in an interview with a child protection worker. This
interview was necessary after the victim was returned from running away from
home. The victim was having arguments with her mother and stepfather over
refusal to let her date a male eight years her senior. The alleged molestations
involved acts of "hugging, kissing, and rubbing the victim's breasts, culminating
with the defendant rubbing under the victim's clothes and inserting his finger
into her vagina."'
126
The state's main case was testimony of the victim and two experts. One,
an expert in family medicine, reported on results of a physical examination of
the victim, finding no positive evidence of abuse. He offered his opinion that
this was not unusual in this type of case. 127 The second expert, Dr. Janzen,
was a child psychologist who was qualified in the area of child sexual abuse.
Dr. Janzen testified that, in his opinion, the victim was telling the truth about
being sexually abused.22 He based this opinion on three interviews with the
victim and a comparison of her symptoms with published background informa-
tion on behavioral characteristics of victims of child sexual abuse. The
defendant appealed the decision to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal.' 29 His major claim was the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Janzen to
testify since the state had failed to release his report as required by Code of
Criminal Procedure article 719.13° Dr. Janzen's report was not made available
to the defendant until the morning of the trial even though the state had the
report for a week. The court of appeal affirmed the conviction holding that the
defendant had failed to show prejudice as a result of the delayed disclosure of
the report, thus finding the delay a harmless error.
Bible, 858 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. 1993); Department of Social Serv. ex rel. Wolf v. McCarty, 506 N.W.2d
144 (S.D. 1993). Four state supreme courts (Missouri, Florida, New Hampshire and Colorado) retain
the use of Frye for special circumstances, particularly the admissibility of novel or technical scientific
evidence. Public Serv. Co. v. Willows Water Dist., 856 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1993); Flanagan v. State,
625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993); Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1993); State
v. Cressy, 628 A.2d 696 (N.H. 1993).
126. Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1118.
127. Id.
128. Id at 1119.
129. State v. Foret, 612 So. 2d 1070 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992) (unpublished).
130. La. Code Crim. P. art. 719 provides:
Upon motion of the defendant, the court shall order the district attorney to permit or
authorize the defendant to inspect and copy.., any results or reports... of physical or
mental examination, and of scientific tests or experiments, made in connection with or
material to the particular case, that are in the possession, custody, control, or knowledge
of the district attorney and intended for use at trial.
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The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writ and reverses the court of
appeal.1 3 ' The opinion offers two theories for reversal: (1) the tardy delivery of
the report was prejudicial, "especially given the questionable scientific basis and
highly influential nature of his testimony"13' and (2) the testimony of the
psychologist "constituted an improper comment on the victim's credibility, and
served to unduly prejudice the defendant."'3 In discussing the proper procedure
and standard in determining admissibility of this testimony, the court adopts
Daubert as the proper interpretation of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702."
B. "Certworthiness" of Foret
Why was writ granted in Foret? The primary reason was to discuss and guide
the trial courts in considering the admission of testimony of a psychologist on the
veracity of a victim of child sexual abuse. Two members of the court in State v.
Brossette35 had expressed grave doubts about this type of testimony. Writ was
denied in Brossette because the defendant had failed to object to the presentation
of this testimony. Justices Dennis and Hall, concurring in the denial, stated:
[T]he introduction of expert testimony as to the psychological charac-
teristics of the victim or her testimony is fraught with serious res nova
constitutional and evidentiary problems. While this type of evidence is
absolutely not admissible for some purposes, but might be admissible for
others, it should be allowed only after careful study and under strict
control by the trial court."
In Foret, the trial judge allowed the expert to testify over the objections of the
defendant both to the delayed disclosure of his report and to giving his opinion that
the victim had been sexually abused. 3 1
Thus, the reasons for granting writ in Daubert and Foret are entirely different.
In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court specifically wanted to address the
issue of proper standards for admissibility of expert scientific testimony and settle
the confusion apparent in the circuit and district courts. In Foret, the Louisiana
Supreme Court wanted to address a specific type of borderline, problematic
testimony and, in doing so, adopted Daubert.'
131. State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1118 (La. 1993).
132. IU
133. it at 1131.
134. Ua at 1123.
135. 599 So. 2d 1092 (La. 1992).
136. Id. (Dennis, J. and Hall, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
137. State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1121 n.3 (La. 1993).
138. Ma at 1123. The court did not consider any approaches being taken by the lower courts in
admitting expert testimony and only reference one previous Louisiana Supreme Court decision.
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C. The Supreme Court Opinion in Foret
In an opinion written by Justice Hall, the court unanimously reverses the
court of appeal. Justice Lemmon, in a concurrence, indicates that he would
reverse solely on the delay in disclosure and would not reach the question of
standards and use of this testimony. 39 Justice Hall justifies deciding this issue
by stating:
In an effort to guide trial courts in the future, we shall explore what
commentators and other jurisdictions consider to be the proper, non-
prejudicial use of such expert testimony. This necessarily requires us
to set out the general guidelines for the admissibility of expert testimo-
ny, as well as setting forth guidelines for admission of this particular
kind of expert testimony. 140
1. The Adoption of Daubert
Justice Hall correctly notes that the general rule controlling admissibility of
expert testimony in Louisiana is Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise. 141
Justice Hall concludes, "As the Louisiana Code of Evidence provision on expert
testimony is identical to the federal Rule, it follows that this court should
carefully consider the Daubert decision that soundly interprets an identical
provision in the federal law of evidence."'1
42
Justice Hall then analyzes the Daubert decision in some detail. He discusses
the replacement of the Frye threshold of "general acceptance" with the new
standard that scientific evidence must be reliable and relevant. "4s He also notes
the requirement of a preliminary assessment by the trial court of this reliability
and relevancy and the guidelines given to assess the reliability of expert scientific
testimony. These guidelines, as stated in Foret, are
139. Id. at 1131 (Lemmon, J., concurring). Justice Dennis also concurred with reasons, but his
concurring opinion was unavailable at this writing.
140. Id. at 1121.
141. La. Code Evid. art. 702.
142. State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1123 (La. 1993). This proposition is also supported by the
official comments to the Louisiana Code of Evidence. "[Elspecially where the language of the
Louisiana Code is identical or virtually identical with that used by other states or in the federal rules,
Louisiana courts now have available a body of persuasive authority which may be instructive in
interpreting the Louisiana Code." La. Code. Evid. art. 102 cmt. a.
143. Foret. 628 So. 2d at 1122.
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"whether or not the technique had been subjected to peer review and/or
publication, the 'known or potential rate of error', the existence of
'standards controlling the technique's operation', the technique's
'refutability' or, more simply put, testability, and, finally, an incorpora-
tion of the Frye general acceptance in the scientific community as only
a factor in the analysis."'"
Justice Hall also notes that the Daubert Court emphasizes the interaction of Rule
702 with other Federal Rules of Evidence, specifically Rule 403 as a "balancing
test that will exclude probative evidence if outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice."'145
Justice Hall then gives a second justification for adopting Daubert. The
Louisiana Supreme Court had previously disapproved of the Frye standard as a
threshold for admissibility in State v. Catanese.146 In that decision, Justice
Dennis considered the admissibility of polygraph evidence in criminal trials. He
discussed the criticism of the Frye standard and declined to adopt it for
Louisiana. 14  The polygraph evidence was denied admissibility in the trial
based on a balancing test: probative value is weighed against the reasons for
exclusion. 48 The evidence, however, might be admitted in post-trial proceed-
ings after the trial judge, in his discretion, determines that "the evidence is
reliable and will aid in a decision."' 49
Justice Hall explains the similarity in the Daubert and Catanese decisions
in refusing the Frye threshold and in giving the trial court discretion to use the
testimony if found to be reliable and to pass the balancing test. Justice Hall then
proceeds to adopt the Daubert requirement for reliability and the "observations"
stated to determine reliability. He writes:
The above-noted similarity between the federal and Louisiana rules on
the admission of expert testimony, coupled with similar guidelines for
the admissibility of expert scientific testimony pronounced by this court
in Catanese, persuade this court to adopt Daubert's requirement that
expert scientific testimony must rise to a threshold level of reliability in
order to be admissible under La.C.E. art. 702. As we find the Daubert
court's "observations" on what will help to determine this threshold
level of reliability to be an effective guide, we shall adopt these
"observations", as well.'O
144. Id (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993)).
145. Id
146. 368 So. 2d 975, 980 (La. 1979).
147. Id at 978-86.
148. Id at 981.
149. Id at 983.
150. State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1123 (La. 1993).
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2. The Application of Rule 702 to This Testimony
Justice Hall deftly uses the Daubert framework to discuss the admissibility
of the testimony of the psychologist that sexual abuse can be diagnosed using a
psychological profile system known as Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome ("CSAAS").'5' His first observation is the lack of any evidentiary
hearing held by the trial court to determine the admissibility of this evidence.
This hearing was impossible since the report was disclosed the day of the trial.
Relying both on commentators and on cases from other jurisdictions, Justice
Hall finds this testimony to be "of highly questionable scientific validity, and
fails to unequivocally pass the Daubert threshold test of scientific "reliabili-
ty. ' 2 He reaches this conclusion by analyzing the use of CSAAS as a
diagnostic tool in terms of the Daubert factors. This use of CSAAS has been
widely criticized and leads Justice Hall to conclude "the use of this technique for
determination of the victim's truthfulness in his or her allegations of abuse is not
one that, even after peer review, has been embraced by the scientific communi-
ty."' Thus, this type of testimony, although subjected to peer review, fails
to satisfy the "general acceptance" standard.
This type of testimony also fails the key factor in the Daubert analy-
sis-testability. Justice Hall writes that this "untestability comes from its very
nature as an opinion as to the causes of human behavior, and the fact that the
methods for testing the results of psychoanalysis are rife with the potential for
inaccuracy.""
The last Daubert factor of known error rate is extracted from a clinical study
that found "the factors relied upon by clinicians in their determinations were
prevalent in 68% of the cases."'" 5 Justice Hall implies that a 32% margin of
error is not sufficiently reliable for a criminal trial.
Having found this type of testimony questionable under Article 702 as
interpreted using the Daubert analysis, Justice Hall states:
In any capacity, it is highly unlikely that it will be useful to a jury on
the issue of a witness' credibility, especially as a tool for determining
whether or not abuse actually occurred. Even if it were, the trial court
made no such finding, and, by failing to exercise its "gatekeeping" role
151. Id. at 1124. TO maintain the focus of this Note on standards to admit expert testimony, a
detailed discussion of CSAAS will not be included. For a review of this area, see Elizabeth V.
Baker, Psychological Expert Testimony on a Child's Veracity in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions,
50 La. L. Rev. 1039 (1990).
152. Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1127.
153. Id at 1125.
154. Id (citing Stephen J. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and
the Unconscious, 68 Va. L. Rev. 971, 995 (1982)).
155. Id at 1126 (quoting Faller, Criteria for Judging the Credibility of Children's Statements
About Their Sexual Abuse, 67 Child Welfare 389 (1988), as cited in John E.B. Myers et al., Expert
Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 75-76 (1989)).
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per Daubert, failed to satisfy what this court believes is a prudent and
necessary standard for evaluation of expert testimony in criminal
cases.
56
3. The Balancing Test of Article 403
The court next considers whether this testimony, assuming it is admissible
under Article 702, will pass the balancing test of Article 403.117 After
discussing how other jurisdictions have decided the question of admissibility of
this type of testimony to bolster the credibility of the witness, Justice Hall
concludes:
This bolstering of credibility has the effect of unfairly prejudicing a
criminal defendant, and, as such, the use of CSAAS-based testimony for
the purpose of bolstering a witness' credibility creates a risk of
prejudice that outweighs its questionable probative value. Given the
near unanimity of other jurisdictions' disapproval of CSAAS-based
testimony as a determinant of abuse, coupled with our observations of
the risk of prejudice inherent in CSAAS, this court now concludes that
such opinion testimony as a determinant of a victim/witness' credibility
is not admissible.1
5 8
This part of the opinion is especially troubling. Justice Hall fails to address
the difference between Louisiana Code of Evidence articles 702 and 608 and to
distinguish evidence used to corroborate testimony of a witness from evidence
used to bolster the credibility of a witness. Louisiana Code of Evidence article
608 specifically addresses character evidence admissible to attack or support
credibility. Article 608, unlike its counterpart Federal Rules of Evidence 608,
does not allow opinion testimony to attack or support credibility of a wit-
ness-only evidence of general reputation may be admitted.' 59  Thus, an
expert's opinion as to the credibility of a witness would not be allowed in
Louisiana. A prominent case cited by Justice Hall is United States v. Azure,"6
which discusses the admissibility of this type of testimony under Federal Rules
of Evidence 608(a) and 702. The court in Azure held that a psychologist's
opinion testimony "went beyond the limitation in Rule 608(a)(1) of only
156. Id. at 1127.
157. La. Code Evid. art. 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time."
158. State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1129 (La. 1993) (emphasis added).
159. La. Code Evid. art. 608 states, in pertinent part: "A. Reputation evidence of character. The
credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of general reputation
only .... " Fed. R. Evid. 608 states, in pertinent part: "(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of
character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of
opinion or reputation .... "
160. 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986).
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addressing character for truthfulness and addressed the specific believability and
truthfulness of Wendy's story." 1' Additionally, the testimony was not
admissible under Rule 702 since opinion testimony on credibility is restricted to
general character testimony on truthfulness. The Azure court did acknowledge
that the psychologist might have aided the jury by generally testifying to medical
evidence of behavioral characteristics of child abuse victims and whether it was
consistent with her story of sexual abuse.
62
Justice Hall indicates that the psychologist's testimony might be admitted for
similar limited purposes, such as to corroborate the other evidence tending to
show the existence of psychological injury to the child victim. The psychologist
could explain in general terms the behavioral characteristics of child abuse
victims to help the jury understand why "superficially bizarre" reactions occur,
such as delayed reporting or recantation.163 Justice Hall then indicates that this
testimony is "being offered to rebut attacks on the victim's credibility."'
' 6
However, as stated earlier, Louisiana Code of Evidence article 608 does not
allow opinion testimony regarding character for credibility to rebut or support the
credibility of a witness.
Expert testimony of general observations could be admitted under Article
702 as helpful to the trier of fact to "understand the evidence or determine a fact
in issue."'165 The evidence would be probative on the issue of whether the
sexual abuse in fact occurred, much in the same way that a medical expert's
opinion that a scar was the product of a knife would corroborate the victim's
testimony that he was stabbed. If the defendant uses the victim's past acts or
past statements to impeach her and to try to prove the abuse did not occur, this
opinion by the expert on consistency of the victim's story with known
characteristics of child abuse victims would help the jury in evaluating the
victim's prior behavior.
D. Changes in Louisiana Evidence Law
Foret definitely changes the law in Louisiana. The trial judge will usually
be required to conduct a preliminary hearing to decide admissibility of expert
testimony by determining (1) qualification of the expert, (2) reliability of the
testimony, (3) helpfulness of the testimony, and (4) prejudicial effect of
admission. How does this compare with past Louisiana jurisprudence? Foret
has no discussion of recent Louisiana jurisprudence which has dealt with
standards of admitting expert testimony. The opinion cites only State v.
Catanese, a case decided in 1979 before the promulgation of the Louisiana Code
161. Id. at 341.
162. Id. at 340.
163. State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1130 (citing Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 273 (Del.
1987)).
164. Id.
165. La. Code. Evid. art. 702.
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of Evidence in 1989. More recent decisions, including one by the Louisiana
Supreme Court, applied other standards.'6
Prior to the adoption of the Louisiana Code of Evidence, the primary case
on expert testimony was State v. Wheeler, 67 in which Justice Dennis set out
two elements as prerequisite to using expert testimony:
(a) the subject of the inference must be so distinctly related to some
science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the
understanding of the average layman; and (b) the witness must have
sufficient skill, knowledge or experience in that field or calling as to
make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier
of fact in his search for truth.'6
Additionally, Justice Dennis discussed other variables to be considered: one, a
preference for direct, concrete evidence, i.e. a direct statement over an inferential
one; two, the purpose of the evidence and how close that purpose is to the main
hub of the trial. This opinion stressed the need for "helpfulness" to the trier of
fact and for evidence with a concrete basis, which is similar to requiring
reliability.' 69 The Wheeler analysis was applied in a civil context in Schwamb
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,7 ° which refused to allow opinion testimony on
credibility of a witness.
After adoption of the Louisiana Code of Evidence, three Louisiana Courts
of Appeal, the second, third and fourth, adopted the standards for admissibility
of expert testimony as established by the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.' That court used four
inquiries for determining the admissibility of expert testimony, the first three
being threshold requirements:
(1) Whether the witness is qualified to express an expert opinion,
Fed.R.Evid. 702;
(2) whether the facts upon which the expert relies are the same type as are
relied upon by other experts in the field, Fed.R.Evid. 703;
(3) whether in reaching his conclusion the expert used a well-founded
methodology, Frye; and
166. See, e.g., State v. Wheeler, 416 So. 2d 78 (La. 1982); Adams v. Chevron, 589 So. 2d 1219
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1991). writ denied, 592 So. 2d 415 (1992); State v. Hill, 601 So. 2d 684 (La. App.
2d Cir.), writ denied, 608 So. 2d 192 (1992); Glankler v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 610 So. 2d 1020
(App. 3d Cir. 1992), writ denied, 614 So. 2d 78 (La. 1993); Adams v. Chevron, 589 So. 2d 1219 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1991), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 415 (1992); Schwamb v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 516 So.
2d 452 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied, 520 So. 2d 750 (1988).
167. 416 So. 2d 78 (La. 1982) (excluded a police officer's opinion on defendant's involvement
in a drug transaction based on body posture of the participants while conversing).
168. Id. at 80.
169. Id. at 81.
170. Schwamb, 516 So. 2d at 460 (excluded expert's opinion on the cause of the accident and
on credibility of the defendant's witness).
171. 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
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(4) assuming the expert's testimony has passed Rules 702 and 703, and the
Frye test, whether under Fed.R.Evid. 403 the testimony's potential for
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. 172
The first Louisiana court to adopt the Christophersen standard was the fourth
circuit in Adams v. Chevron,173 which also cited Article 702. The second
circuit adopted the Adams and Christophersen reasoning in State v. Hill.174
The third circuit followed Adams and Christophersen in Glankler v. Rapides
Parish School Board.
175
These three circuit courts will now need to substitute the Daubert analysis
as adopted in Foret for the Frye standard listed in the third requirement of the
Christophersen analysis. The other requirements of Christophersen fit well
within both the Daubert and Foret analysis.
IV. SUMMARY
What is the current procedure to admit or deny expert testimony? The
procedure is similar for federal and state courts. First, the trial judge must
actively play a role in determining the admissibility of the evidence under Article
104(A).176  The proper standards to use are governed by Articles 702 and
403. 177 This determination may require an evidentiary hearing where inquiry
is made into the qualifications of the expert, the reliability of his testimony, the
helpfulness of the proposed testimony, and the prejudicial effect. The inquiry for
reliability of expert scientific evidence includes at a minimum the four factors
listed in Daubert: testability, peer review or publication, rate of error and known
standards, and "general acceptance." If the testimony satisfies Article 702, then
the judge must also consider Article 403 and balance the probative value of the
evidence against the prejudicial effect.
'There are a number of remaining questions. One of these is the interaction
of Frye with the other three factors in the Daubert analysis. Of the four factors,
the "general acceptance" standard of Frye is an easy way to admit scientific
evidence that has been long recognized as reliable and admissible in court.
When the evidence is outside "general acceptance" of the particular scientific
community, then the other three factors must be considered. Of those three,
testability is considered as a primary requirement. If the evidence is concerned
172. Id. at 1110.
173. 589 So. 2d 1219, 1223 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 415 (1992)
(admitted vessel captain's testimony concerning standards of good seamanship).
174. 601 So. 2d 684, 692 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 608 So. 2d 192 (1992) (excluded the
defendant's linguistic expert who wished to testify concerning his analysis of the interrogations or
interviews, and testimony of the state's witnesses).
175. 610 So. 2d 1020, 1027 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), writ denied, 614 So. 2d 78 (1993) (admitted
testimony of expert in the field of supervision of children in a playground setting).
176. La. Code Evid. art.. 104(A). See also Fed. R. Evid. 104(a).
177. La. Code Evid. arts. 702, 403. See also Fed. R. Evid. 702, 403.
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with a new scientific technique, then the rate of error and the existence of
standards are important. In considering evidence using a scientific technique, for
instance DNA profile data, the qualification of the expert and the methodology
must be viewed together. Not only must the principles upon which the technique
is based be reliable, but also the laboratory analysis based on this technique
conducted by this expert for this case.
Another question concerns whether there are differences in civil and criminal
trials, as exemplified by Daubert and Foret. There are differences in Daubert
and Foret in handling borderline evidence. This may be the result of the type
of expert scientific testimony at issue. In Daubert, the testimony is on
traditional, basic scientific experiments, and Justice Blackmun favors admission.
In Foret, the inadmissible testimony comes from experiments in the social
sciences on prediction of human behavior-a field which deals with less
predictable events.
The major difference is that Daubert is a civil trial and Foret is a criminal
trial. Justice Blackmun in Daubert favors admission and initial consideration of
the jury of "shaky" evidence. He believes the adversarial system is the best way
to handle this evidence by "vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof."' 7 8 He also cites with
approval judges that direct a verdict based on sufficiency of evidence as a whole.
On the contrary, Justice Hall in Foret would not admit this type of "borderline"
evidence even though it might marginally pass Article 702 standards. He would
exclude such testimony under Article 403 by finding the probative value
substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect, especially if the jury would
most likely consider it as a prohibited "opinion" regarding the credibility of the
witness, and not merely as marginally corroborative of the existence of a
psychological condition.
Reaching different results in civil and criminal trials, based on the balance
of the interests involved, seems inherently reasonable though there is no
difference in the requirements as stated in either Article 702 or 403. In a civil
trial, the standard of proof for either the plaintiff or defendant to meet is
preponderance of the evidence. The participants are on equal grounds concern-
ing resources and sympathy with the jury. The jury in a civil trial may have a
more healthy skepticism of experts paid by the plaintiff or defendant to support
their side of the argument. In considering the balance of Article 403, the
prejudicial effect of "shaky" expert testimony would be equal whether presented
by the plaintiff or defendant. On the other hand, in a criminal trial the standard
for the prosecution to meet is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Typically, the
resources of the prosecution are much greater than that of the accused. Also,
juries may be less skeptical of a state expert witness, believing them to present
a fairer picture, and tend to give their testimony great weight. The prejudicial
178. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798.(1993) (citing Rock
v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2714 (1987)).
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effect against the defendant of expert testimony presented by the prosecution is
very high, and thus this testimony should be very reliable before it could pass the
balancing test of Article 403.
A difference also exists in the ability of a criminal or civil trial judge to
handle marginal evidence that is admitted. In a civil case, often the expert
testimony is the primary evidence of the plaintiff and defendant. In the
Bendectin litigation, the trial judges often granted summary judgment or
judgment n.o.v. due to insufficiency of the evidence. In a criminal case, only
rarely would a conviction be reversed due to low probative value of the expert
testimony. The "balancing" must occur before the evidence is submitted to the
jury at the time the evidence is offered by the prosecution. But when offered by
the defendant, a serious question arises concerning which policy should be
followed. Should the court admit the evidence and allow the jury to decide its
weight, or should the court make this determination by simply excluding the
evidence? The balancing test under Article 403 may lead to admission, since the
jury may view the expert testifying for the defendant with the same healthy
skepticism as would be given experts in a civil trial. This is an issue that courts
will increasingly face.
The Daubert decision and analysis is a reasonable answer to Learned Hand's
question of how the law can best use expert scientific testimony. 7 9 The
analysis easily admits scientific evidence based on general acceptance but will
also admit testimony whose reliability can be shown by other factors. The
federal courts and the Louisiana state courts, after Foret, now have available a
workable framework on which to base a consideration of admissibility of expert
scientific testimony.
Bonnie J. Davist
179. Hand, supra note 1.
t Recipient of the Vinson & Elkins Best Student Article Award, 1994.
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